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1 INTRODUCTION
A prominent feature of aid policy in the 1990s has been
the increasing tendency of donors to make the
provision of development assistance conditional on
political and administrative reform in recipient
countries - political conditionality for short. While
not an entirely new phenomenon, political conditionality
represents a distinct departure from the consensus view
which prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s based on the
principle of national sovereignty, that aid should not be
used to influence domestic politics. Of course political
considerations clearly influenced aid allocation decisions
in the past, and there are examples of donors using aid
to support democratic reform or withholding aid to
punish regimes which displayed a blatant disregard for
human rights. What is distinct about the new
conditionality is that it has become a central tenet of aid
policy for the majority of aid donors, and that political
factors now constitute a major consideration in aid
allocation decisions.
The aims of political conditionality are threefold: to
promote democratic reform, to improve human rights,
and to enhance administrative efficiency. These are
often subsumed beneath of rubric of 'good government'
which presupposes a high level of organizational
effectiveness in the management of public affairs and
adherence to the principles of accountability, openness,
transparency and the rule of law) A more fundamental
and longer-term objective is that good government can
bring about improved economic performance and
social welfare.
This article examines the validity of these objectives
and expectations, focusing on contemporary attempts
by donors to promote political reform through
conditioned aid. It begins by reviewing donor policies
on good government and political conditionality and
the assumptions and objectives underpinning these
policies in the light of past experience. The main part of
the article considers whether conditionality will
achieve its objectives by examining the application of
political conditionality in the cases of Indonesia, Kenya
and Malawi. It concludes by indicating the conditions
under which negative measures will be effective in
promoting political and administrative reform, suggests
Brautigam (1991) provides useful definitions of the key terms
underlying the governance concept. For a critique see Moore (1993)
in this Bulletin.
that positive forms of assistance are likely to be more
conducive to reform and more acceptable to recipient
governments, though difficult to implement.
2 DONOR POLICIES ON POLITICAL
CONDITIONALITY
Past precedents
There is nothing new about attaching political
conditions to aid provision; decisions on country aid
allocations have always been influenced by strategic,
diplomatic and ideological considerations.2
One of the primary motives of US aid during the Cold
War was to counter the spread of communism in
developing countries. President Kennedy's Alliance
for Progress initiative in the early 1960s had overt
political objectives even though the emphasis was on
economic and social development. The Kennedy
administration attempted to nurture democratic
governments in Latin America through immediate
diplomatic recognition and guarantees of aid, and
adopted a negative attitude towards military regimes.
In practice, however, more pressing foreign policy
objectives stemming from the desire to counter Soviet
influence in the region led to an early demise for the
initiative, contributing instead to the consolidation of
authoritarian rule in the majority of Latin American
countries from the mid-l960s. For much of the next
two decades, military governments were rewarded for
their suppression of internal dissent, through generous
provision of development aid and military assistance
(Furlong 1980; Forsythe 1989). The US government
used its leverage to prevent radical governments in
Chile, Cuba and Nicaragua from receiving concessional
loans from the World Bank and the IMF. Political
considerations also underpinned decisions on aid
allocations elsewhere; Israel, for instance, became the
largest recipient of US bilateral aid after the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war.
The US was not alone in using aid to promote foreign
policy objectives. China and the Eastern bloc states
rewarded allies in the South with economic aid and
military assistance. The Nordic countries, especially
Sweden and Norway, favoured regimes which
2 This was expressed in very blunt terms by the former Permanent
Secretary of the ODA, Sir William Ryrie, who characterized the
political objectives of the British aid programme as 'making friends,
buying and keeping influence' (Ryrie 1986: 7).
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espoused democratic socialism, non-alignment and a
commitment to popular welfare. As a consequence of
these policies countries such as India, Tanzania,
Vietnam and Zambia all figured prominently as major
recipients of Nordic aid in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Although political criteria often featured as important
aid policy considerations, especially those governing
country allocations, these did not amount to conditions
that individual countries were obliged to meet in order
to qualify for aid. Human rights are an exception in that
several donors, notably Canada, the Netherlands,
Norway, and the United States, incorporated explicit
criteria into their aid programmes in the past.
A 1975 amendment to the US development assistance
act effectively barred countries found guilty of a
consistent pattern of gross human rights violations
from receiving aid. At the same time, support is
provided for encouraging the observance of human
rights in recipient countries. Canada has also stipulated
that countries which contravene the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights will be denied aid or have
it reduced substantially (at various times Uganda,
Equatorial Guinea, El Salvador, Guatemala and
Suriname). Human rights promotion is also a major
Canadian aid policy objective. The Netherlands takes
the view that, while human rights criteria (defined to
include economic and social rights as well as civil and
political) influence country allocations, alongside
poverty considerations and the social and economic
policies of the recipient government, aid should not be
used to manipulate recipients or to punish transgression
(Hill 1991; Tomasevski 1989).
Although human rights criteria have been employed by
some donors to guide country aid policies, these have
not been applied systematically, especially when they
conflict with strategic interests. US aid to El Salvador
in the 1980s is a case in point, when this tiny Central
American country became the third largest recipient of
US aid despite extensive documentation of human
rights abuses.
New concerns
In political conditionality, some elements of the
traditional emphasis on human rights are retained.
However it goes further in covering the rules and
procedures which underpin regime legitimacy and
accountability, openness, transparency in decision
making, and administrative competence, collectively
referred to as 'good governance'.
The most recent precedent for making the provision of
aid conditional on political and administrative reforms
is Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War
when countries displaying a commitment to economic
and political reform were rewarded with aid pledges by
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Western donors. The European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development only makes finance
available to those countries in the region committed to
the principles of multi-party democracy, pluralism and
market economics. The perceived similarities between
statist forms of economic management and authoritarian
government in both the command economies of
Eastern Europe and many developing countries
(especially in sub-Saharan Africa) led many donors to
explore the potential for linking aid to political reforms
in the latter. However, whereas political liberalization
preceded aid in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, in Africa political reform is being used as a
condition for aid (ODI 1992).
Donor interest in questions of democracy and good
government in developing countries is driven by two
further considerations: (a) political factors are seen as
major obstacles to successful economic adjustment;
and (b) an increasing momentum in favour of
democratization within a growing number of African
countries. Moreover, with the decline of East-West
conflict, donors feel increasingly justified in promoting
democracy and pluralism in their own right without
being accused of neo-colonialism.
Policy positions
Donor policies on political conditionality were spelt out
in a series of pronouncements by Western political
leaders and development ministers in 1990 and 1991.
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd outlined Britain's
policy stance in a much-publicized speech in June 1990
in which he listed a series of criteria for applying aid
conditionality (Hurd 1990):
Countries which tend towards pluralism, public
accountability, respect for the rule of law, human
rights, market principles, should be encouraged.
Governments which persist with repressive policies,
corrupt management, wasteful and discredited
economic systems should not expect us to support
their folly with scarce aid resources which could be
used better elsewhere.
The British Minister for Overseas Development,
Baroness Chalker, elaborated on the theme in a speech
the following year in which she stressed positive
measures to strengthen administrative capacity and
promote pluralism rather than simply cutting off aid as
a punitive gesture. She identified four components of
good government: sound economic and social policies,
free markets and an enhanced role for the private
sector, the provision of essential services and curbs on
military expenditure; the need for training to improve
the administrative capacity and competence of
government; open and accountable political systems,
the reduction of corruption anda free press; respect for
human rights and the rule of law (Chalker 1991).
Germany introduced new aid policy guidelines at the
end of 1991 in which it listed five criteria for granting
development aid: these are respect for human rights,
popular participation in the development process,
guaranteeing certainty in law, a 'market-friendly'
approach to economic development, and the recipient
government's own commitment to poverty alleviation,
protecting the environment, and curbing population
growth. Reduced military expenditure is also taken into
account in assessing government commitment to
poverty alleviation since additional resources may be
released for this purpose as a result. These criteria have
been adopted with the explicit aim of facilitating the
implementation of a poverty-oriented development
strategy and now guide decisions on country aid
allocations (van de Sand and Mohs 1992). Like Britain,
the emphasis in German aid policy is on a range of
positive measures to improve human rights, including
channelling a larger proportion through churches and
non-governmental organizations, rather than simply
cutting off development assistance which would only
be used in the final resort.
The United States has also been active in defining its
policy stance on political conditionality and has been
more willing than other donors to use aid funds to
support democratic political development as an explicit
policy objective. In 1990 it announced a 'Democracy
Initiative' which aims to strengthen democratic
representation, respect for human rights, promoting
lawful governance (support for legislatures and
improved legal and judicial systems), and encouraging
democratic values through leadership training and
civic education. Progress towards democracy and
evidence of respect for human rights and the rule of law
are taken into account in country aid allocations.
Other bilateral donors have also followed suit although
there are differences in the emphasis they give to the
various components of good government. These to
some extent reflect their differing ideological predis-
positions. Britain and Germany, for example, include a
degree of market orientation among their criteria,
whereas Canada and Norway lay particular stress on
the promotion of human rights and poverty reduction.
Despite these differences, there is a large measure of
agreement on the basic principles of good governance,
and by implication, on the linking of aid to political
reform, as reflected in recent pronouncements of the
EC and the OECD's Development Assistance
Committee (DAC). On the recommendations of the
Commission, which prop&sed some form of linkage in
March 1991, the EC Council of Development
Ministers resolved in November to make aid
conditional on respect for human rights and democracy
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in recipient countries. In December the High-level
Meeting of the DAC singled out democratization,
respect for human rights and good governance as basic
conditions for achieving sustainable development.3
Both moves confirmed a growing willingness of donors
to take the issue of good government and democracy
seriously, which was evident from a series of
subsequent actions by member states and country aid
consortia in regard to particular recipient countries.
3 CONDITIONALITY IN PRACTICE
Donors employ three sets of measures to promote
political reform: a reduction, redirection or termination
of aid funds, an increase in aid to reward efforts at
democratization, and specialized forms of assistance.
There are some instances where individual donors have
suspended or terminated bilateral aid on the grounds of
persistent violations of human rights, endemic
corruption and the consequent paralysis of the
administrative machinery, and denial of basic civil and
political rights by autocratic political leaders, although
this remains very much a last resort. Britain, for
example, has cut off capital aid to Sudan, Somalia and
Burma for such reasons, although it continues to
provide humanitarian assistance. Belgium and France
suspended aid to Zaire following consistent reports of
human rights abuses and to express official displeasure
at the unwillingness of President Mobutu to
countenance political reform. The US government
suspended aid to Haiti following a military coup that
deposed the democratically elected government of
Jean-Bertrand Aristide in October 1991.
However none of these bilateral actions succeeded in
provoking any substantive changes in the way these
countries manage their political affairs. Indeed, the
situation in Somalia has markedly worsened, with a
state of near anarchy prevailing amidst widespread
death and destruction with no end in sight to the civil
war in the country. In Zaire, President Mobutu has
made some cosmetic changes by co-opting key
opposition figures into the government but the national
constitutional conference is moribund and the status
quo ante remains in place. In Haiti the military
government continues in power.
A possible exception is Suriname which had a major aid
package worth $1.5 billion (including humanitarian
aid) suspended by the Dutch government in December
1990 after a military coup pending the return of stable
democracy. This was the second time that such action
had been taken by the Dutch, the first being in 1982
following the execution of 15 opposition leaders by the
military government which had come to power in a
'In April 1992 the DAC produced a review of its members' policies on the degree of consensus that now exists among donors on these issues
good governance and participatory development which underscored (OCED 1992).
coup two years earlier. In November 1991 the Dutch
offered to resume aid because of moves towards
democracy and the implementation of austerity
measures recommended by the World Bank. It is
plausible that the suspension of aid by the Netherlands
played a key role in fostering political liberalization
because Suriname was a former Dutch colony and
because of the very large amount of aid at stake.
In general there is a marked preference for positive
forms of assistance, in the form of increased aid for
newly-installed democratic governments (the United
States, for example, increased aid to Benin from $1 to
$10 million when the new government took power in
1991) or to assist with the process of. democratic
transition by funding and training election commissions,
electoral monitoring, with registration procedures, etc.
Aid is also provided for a wide variety of specialist
purposes to promote good government, some of which
are novel (support for local radio, establishing legal aid
schemes, helping to create ombudsman, etc.), although
others are conventional technical assistance projects
with new labels to fit in with the fashion (civil service
reform, mechanisms to improve financial
accountability, etc.).
Despite the odd exception, most donors are committed
to joint action which they perceive to be more effective
than bilateral initiatives in promoting political change.
This is partly because bilateral efforts have for the most
part failed and partly because individual donors fear
the loss of trading status or political influence if they
suspend or terminate aid.
It is to three recent examples of j oint action in applying
negative conditionality - in the case of Indonesia,
Kenya and Malawi - that we now turn our attention.
Indonesia
East Timor was unilaterally annexed by Indonesia in
1976 and has remained under military occupation ever
since, with regular reports of extensive human rights
abuses and mass killings of Timorese by the Indonesian
army. It has remained a thorn in the side of Indonesia's
attempts to raise its international profile ever since,
with the issue of East Timor being kept alive by human
rights groups and the Portuguese government, which
formerly ruled over the territory before granting it
independence in 1975.
The massacre of at least 50 unarmed civilians by the
Indonesian government during a peaceful demon-
stration in East Timor in November 1991 provoked
widespread international condemnation, especially
from major donors and trading partners. Denmark and
the Netherlands suspended their aid programmes
while Canada halted discussions on future aid.
Australia, the US and Japan, all expressed concern and
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demanded a full investigation, with members of the US
Congress demanding a cessation in military aid.
Portugal, which has no direct trade or diplomatic
relations with Indonesia, urged the EC to impose a
trade embargo.
The Indonesian response to Western criticism was on
several levels. At stake was nearly $5 billion in foreign
aid, which accounted for one-fifth of government
receipts in the 1991-92 budget. Government officials
reacted sharply, accusing former colonial powers of
ganging up on it and infringing its national sovereignty.
Immediately after the massacre the government
formed a seven-person investigation team to study
what had happened. An advance report produced by
the investigating team stated that soldiers had used
excessive force and gave a higher casualty figure than
that produced by the army which claimed to have fired
in self-defence. Soon after, two senior generals
responsible for military affairs in East Timor were
relieved of their posts, and the army set up a
disciplinary council to investigate and report on the
incident. Eventually sentences of 18 months or less
were given to 10 soldiers court-martialled for their
involvement in the shootings. It was also announced
that the battalion of soldiers involved would be
withdrawn from East Timor. At the same time the
government proceeded with the prosecution of the
demonstrators on charges of subversion, with four
Timorese receiving sentences ranging from nine years
to life imprisonment.
In February 1992 the Indonesian Foreign Minister
went on a diplomatic offensive to explain his country's
position on East Timor and to present the official
version of events. During the course of his visit to
Tokyo, the Japanese government, which is the largest
aid donor to Indonesia, providing $1.3 billion in official
development assistance in 1991, announced that its aid
package would not be affected by the events in East
Timor, despite strong parliamentary opposition. It
expressed satisfaction with the Indonesian response in
the form of the enquiry and subsequent actions taken
by the government.
Although most other bilateral donors subseqflently
accepted the findings of the investigation team and
welcomed the response of the Indonesian government,
the EC under Portugal's presidency did not initially
react to the release of the report. Portugal wanted a
UN-negotiated solution to the East Timor issue and
favoured an intensification of pressure to ensure proper
adherence to human rights, seeking to make EC aid
conditional on progress in these matters. However,
under pressure from the other member states, the EC
fell into line and said that it was encouraged by the
government's response.
In contrast to most EC members, the Dutch
government maintained that future aid would be linked
to the country's human rights record. However, in
March the tables were turned on the Dutch by the
Indonesians who accused the former colonial power of
using aid to pressurize them on human rights. In a
calculated snub the government spurned all Dutch aid,
giving the Netherlands one month to phase out all
development assistance. This was later followed up by a
directive issued to private associations in the country
which obliged them to turn down any development
assistance from the Netherlands, including that
channelled through non-governmental organizations,
which in the Dutch case amounted to about $15 million
annually. The move was expected to stifle criticism of
the government from independent legal and human
rights bodies which depended on Dutch NGO aid for a
large proportion of their funding, thereby running
counter to donor intentions to broaden public debate
and promote civic associations as part of their efforts to
encourage good government.4
The Indonesian government also unilaterally disbanded
the Inter-Government Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a
14-member aid consortium chaired by the Netherlands,
which for 24 years had co-ordinated donor aid policies
and programmes. It then approached the World Bank
with a request that it should establish a new aid
grouping which would be composed of all the original
members of IGGI except for the Dutch. Although
Dutch aid was a relatively small component of the total
(out of $4.8 billion in aid commitments in June 1991,
the Dutch component was about $91 million, just 2 per
cent of the total - 80 per cent was provided by Japan,
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank), the
impact was likely to make itself felt in the short term
given Indonesia's worsening current account deficit.
Clearly political considerations outweighed the
immediate economic loss.
Most donors accepted the Indonesian government's
initiative and a new aid consortium was formed under
the World Bank's stewardship. In a letter to the
Indonesian Finance Minister accepting the invitation
the Bank was reported as saying that it 'appreciates and
values greatly the constructive dialogue between the
Government of Indonesia, the donor community and
the World Bank and looks forward to continued close
collaboration'.5
At its first meeting in Paris in July, members of the new
consortium pledged nearly $5 million in development
aid, indicating that they were not tying aid to human
rights despite Dutch and Portuguese attempts to make
the new aid package conditional on improved human
rights performance. The outcome of the meeting was a
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clear victory for the Indonesian government, which
followed up its success by retaining two US public
relations firms to produce an English-language
brochure defending its policy on East Timor.
Following its failure to influence the outcome of the aid
consortium meeting Portugal blocked the start of
negotiations over a new EC-ASEAN co-operation
agreement designed to increase European investments
in the region and to heighten EC influence over
environment policies in the ASEAN countries. British
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, who was due to
attend the ASEAN's dialogue with its main trading
partner's, described the Portuguese action as
'regrettable'.6
The case of East Timor provides a good illustration of
how individual donors were unable to have much
influence on a country's human rights performance
through aid conditionality when they acted unilaterally,
especially if the volume of aid was small in relation to
the total (as in the case of the Netherlands) or if they
had no direct aid links (Portugal). Trade and
diplomatic considerations clearly took precedence over
rhetorical commitments to human rights. Australia, for
example, feared a loss of influence in the region should
it adopt too active a stance - it had worked closely with
the Indonesian government on regional trading
initiatives and the Cambodian peace process in recent
years and was reluctant to jeopardize its working
relationship. Japan, as the largest aid donor and a major
trading partner, had obvious economic interests at
stake. The World Bank, which willingly took on the
role of convening a new aid consortium, sees Indonesia
as a success story for its economic policy prescriptions.
Moreover, Indonesia is a large, and fast growing
economy, which most donors would consider too
valuable to 'lose' for the sake of human rights
considerations.
Nevertheless, in spite of the Indonesian government's
best efforts and the reluctance of the donor community
to act decisively over its human rights record in East
Timor, the issue is unlikely to disappear in the face of
continued pressure from international human rights
groups. At the same time, the evidence would suggest
that conditioned aid is unlikely to have much impact in
this regard.
Kenya
In the face of growing donor interest in questions of
democracy and good government in sub-Saharan
Africa, Kenya has come increasingly under the
spotlight as one of the few countries holding out against
the trend towards political liberalization in the
'Far East Economic Review, 14 May 1992. 'Far East Economic Review, 30 July 1992.
'Indonesia Development News Quarterly, Spring 1992.
continent. The summer of 1990 saw widespread rioting
in the country in protest against the lack of change in
the country's political system, sparked by a deteriorating
economic climate, which resulted in at least 20 deaths
from police firings in the course of anti-government
demonstrations.
Soon after the government's crackdown on political
dissent several bilateral donors became more forthright
in their criticisms of the Moi regime. In July 1990 the
four Nordic countries warned Kenya that aid
agreements worth $80 million could be jeopardized if it
continued to ignore calls for greater democracy by the
country's fledgling opposition movement. Diplomatic
relations were severed and new aid commitments were
suspended in November when Norway criticized the
Kenyan government's arrest of a political refugee
formerly resident in Norway. Denmark subsequently
held back a quarter of its bilateral aid commitments
with the intention of directing more through NGOs
and grassroots organizations, on the grounds that
endemic corruption made the functioning of an
effective aid programme impossible.7 Denmark's
action was more than purely financial since it caused
delays on the construction of grain silos in Mombasa
which was regarded as a prestige project by the Kenyan
government.8
The United States also adopted a tough stance over
Kenya's human rights record. At the instigation of
Senator Edward Kennedy, the foreign aid appro-
priations act which was passed in November 1990
specified four specific human rights conditions which
the Kenyan government would be obliged to meet
before $15 million in economic and military aid could
be released.9 Despite the imposition of these conditions
the administration granted $5 million in military
assistance in February 1991, ostensibly in acknow-
ledgement that marginal improvements had taken
place, but also to reward Kenyan support during the
Gulf War. Following the subsequent detention of
prominent lawyer and journalist Gitobu Imanyara,
editor of the NairobiLaw Monthly, two weeks later, the
US State Department called for prompt action by the
Kenyan authorities over his arrest and other human
rights issues. The outspoken American ambassador,
Smith Hempstone, made representations on behalf of
growing tendency of donors to channel aid funds through non-
governmental channels helps to explain the government's decision to
introduce a Non-governmental Organizations Registration Bill in
December 1990 which requires voluntary agencies to register with
the government. A co-ordination board to oversee their activites and
finances was also set up by President Moi and his ministers
(Burkhalter 1991).
'African Economic Digest, 19 November 1990.
'These conditions were that the Kenyan government should take
steps to release all political prisoners, the ending of mistreatment of
prisoners, restoration of the independence of the judiciary and
freedom of expression (Burkhalter 1991).
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detained opposition activists and other foreign
embassies publicly criticized the Kenyan government's
actions.
Britain, in contrast, had up until this point favoured a
softer approach focused on diplomatic pressure behind
the scenes, but had grown increasingly frustrated with
Moi's resistance to political reforms and continued
suppression of political freedom and human rights.'8
Good government was prominent on the agenda at the
Commonwealth Summit in Harare in September 1991,
despite the reservations expressed by the governments
of India, Malaysia and Zimbabwe. On the eve of the
Summit, opposition leaders in Kenya publicly urged
Britain and other Western governments to honour their
commitments to democracy and good government by
exerting pressure in the Moi government through aid
conditionality. In an interview with the London
Guardian, Gitobu Imanyara stated: 'We'd like Mr Hurd
to tell us that the British government is not going to
make Kenya an exception, and that British aid will be
made conditional on our ability to conform to
internationally accepted standards of behaviour."
In August 1991 prominent oppositionists formed the
Foundation for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)
as a non-party pressure group. The government
responded to its attempt to stage a rally in Nairobi in
November by arresting the top leadership and forcibly
dispersing a crowd of several thousand that had
assembled. Several Western governments publicly
criticized the government's actions provoking angry
denunciations from the Kenyan Foreign Minister who
accused the US and others of 'masterminding and
abetting' the FORD movement.'2
The crunch for Kenya came soon afterwards at the
meeting of aid donors at the Kenya Consultative Group
meeting in Paris on November 25, when participants
resolved to withhold new aid commitments worth
$1 billion for a period of six months pending progress
on political and economic reforms, specifically in the
areas of human rights and corruption. A cabinet
reshuffle a week earlier which had resulted in the
sacking of a senior minister widely believed to be
implicated in the murder of the former foreign minister
Robert Ouku, failed to dissuade donor resolve.
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd elaborated on Britain's policy of
linking aid to good government to the Foreign Affairs Select
Committee in December 1990, explaining that there were three
stages in its application. Private expressions of concern would be
followed by public warnings, and only if there was still no positive
response from the recipient government would aid be cut. This
would seem to be the approach used in the case of Kenya. The Times,
20 December 1990.
The Guardian, 10September 1991.
2 The Guardian, 19November 1991.
The Kenyan government responded with alacrity,
which would indicate that concerted donor pressure
had panicked it into action.13 In early December
President Moi announced that a multi-party system
would be duly installed with free and competitive
elections held by March 1993. A meeting of delegates of
the ruling KANU party agreed to repeal the 1982
provision of the Kenyan constitution that made it a
de jure one party state. Moi's announcement provoked
a number of defections by senior party officials,
including five ministers and the former KANU party
chairman, to the opposition.
FORD reacted cautiously to the announcement, calling
for a series of prior constitutional changes that would
be required to permit free and fair elections. These
would include the repeal of draconian laws, the
unconditional release of all political prisoners,
limitations on presidential terms of office, and electoral
observers to oversee the voting. The expectation was
that President Moi would call an early election in order
to use his monopoly of state resources to the advantage
of the ruling party. Rather what took place was a serious
outbreak of tribal violence in the Rift Valley and
Western Kenya, allegedly at the instigation of members
of the president's minority Kalenjin tribe anxious to
preserve their political dominance. In March 1992 the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Nairobi challenged
Moi's commitment to multi-party politics, accusing
the government of fomenting the violence in order to
derail the process of political liberalization.'4
Although at the time of writing the outcome of the
elections is unknown, it is nevertheless clear that
concerned donor action in making aid commitments
conditional on progress in human rights and political
reform spurred the President to make concessions that
could potentially unseat the ruling party. Whatever the
outcome, it is likely that donors will wish to project the
reforms that have taken place in the best possible light
in order to protect trade and diplomatic interests. It is
notable in this regard that ihe aid consortium decision
did not amount to an aid freeze as such since it was not
binding on individual donors, some of whom continued
to disburse aid. Britain, for example, suspended
balance of payments support but continued to provide
project aid and humanitarian assistance. France
resumed its aid programme once the six months
suspension had elapsed, although the consortium was
not planning to review the situation until September.
The US, in contrast, was awaiting a decision on a firm
date for multi-party elections before reconsidering its
position. Unless there is a marked deterioration in the
"In an interview with the BBC, President Moi admitted that he had
been forced to concede multi-party democracy as a result of
international pressure and that he harboured grave misgivings about
it, warning that it could lead to tribalism. The Independent, 18
January 1992.
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political environment a favourable outcome of the next
donor meeting is likely in view of Kenya's economic
and political importance in the region.
Malawi
Like Kenya, Malawi was long favoured by Western aid
donors for its adherence to pragmatic economic policies
and political stability; its poor record on human rights,
political freedoms and poverty indicators were largely
overlooked since it was perceived to be a strategic ally
against Moscow-backed Mozambique during the Cold
War years. However in the l990s, the autocratic regime
of Life President Kamuzu Banda appeared increasingly
isolated and anachronistic as more and more countries
in Africa accepted the need for democratic reforms. Aid
donors were forced to act in the face of Banda's refusal
to brook any concessions and the imprisonment of the
prominent trade unionist Chakufwa Chihana who had
returned from exile in Zambia to mobilize support for a
pro-democracy conference in the country. Several days
of rioting in early May, in which 40 people were killed
and several hundred injured in the most serious
demonstration of anti-government feeling since
independence in 1964, preceded a meeting of the
Malawi aid consortium in Paris.
Aid donors attending the consortium meeting on May
12-14 suspended all non-humanitarian aid to the
country, which amounted to some $74 million. A
statement issued by the World Bank after the meeting
said that aid donors were 'seeking tangible and
irreversible evidence of a basic transformation' in the
government's record on human rights and basic
freedoms. The consortium members decided to review
the situation after six months to see what progress had
been made. In the meantime they pledged $170 million
in humanitarian assistance to help the government cope
with the effects of drought and a huge refugee influx
from neighbouring Mozambique, although this was
$100 million less than the amount requested by the
Banda regime.
The government has not as yet introduced any
substantive reforms in the form of political reforms in
response to the aid consortium's decision to suspend
development aid, although there have been one or two
minor concessions designed to demonstrate some
degree of willingness to cooperate. The International
Committee of the Red Cross has been allowed to
inspect prisons and detention centres. Several long-
term political prisoners were released from jail, among
them Chafukwa Chihana, who was released on bail
from the country's maximum security prison in July
According to official figures 240 lost their lives in ethnic violence in
the first six months of 1992, although this is considered by many
observers to be an underestimate (Biles 1992).
but subsequently re-arrested on sedition charges after
speaking out in favour of democracy. Elections were
held at the end of June although the opposition in exile
called for a boycott since all the candidates had to be
approved personally by the president. The government
claimed an 80 per cent turnout but this was disputed by
observers monitoring the polls who said that voting
figures were low.
There is little as yet to inspire confidence among
Western donors that the government will make decisive
moves in favour of democracy, but while the Life
President remains in power, many are pessimistic
about the immediate prospects for any substantive
political reforms.
4 CONCLUSIONS
The three examples we have examined raise several
pointers about the prospects for punitive measures in
the form of aid suspension or termination having a
positive effect on political freedoms and human rights.
The most obvious conclusion is that conditioned aid is
unlikely to have the desired effect unless there is co-
ordinated donor action under the auspices of aid
consortia. The example of East Timor illustrates how a
unilateral action on the part of a single donor, in this
case the Netherlands, failed in its attempt to force a
greater commitment to human rights by the
Indonesian government. In fact through shrewd
manoeuvring the Indonesians were able to reject aid
from the Netherlands altogether and secure an aid
package which compensated for the loss of Dutch
assistance although such capacity to manoeuvre is
probably an attribute of large, diplomatically astute
and economically powerful countries in Asia rather
than the majority of aid dependent and debt-ridden
states in sub-Saharan Africa. One might conclude from
this experience that the Dutch initiative was misplaced
and that strong Asian governments are more likely to
respond favourably to positive encouragement rather
than intimidation. More to the point it demonstrates
that when donors are unwilling to act decisively and in
concert for fear of a loss of trading and diplomatic
status, a government confident of its strategic
importance and possessing a favourable profile with
lending institutions such as the World Bank, can afford
to ignore unilateral threats of conditionality when the
volume of aid at stake is relatively small.'5
The exception is where a single donor provides an
overwhelming proportion of total aid and has
disproportionate diplomatic influence, but such cases
are comparatively rare. Suriname is one such example,
where the Dutch were able to use their aid as a lever to
promote political reform in the l990s, although
entrenched authoritarian governments may be prepared
5 Similar considerations prevailed when donors tailed to take decisive
action over China's brutal suppression of the pro-democracy
movement in 1989.
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to resist donor pressure at great economic cost to their
citizens simply to preserve their dominance, as a prior
Dutch decision to suspend aid to the country in the
1 980s demonstrated.
The Kenyan case indicates that punitive measures can
be effective in instigating reforms when donors take
joint action in the form of aid suspension, although they
may have relatively little influence over the subsequent
course of political liberalization. However the Malawi
case provides weak support for this proposition which
would suggest that the effects of political conditionality,
even when applied by donors acting in concert, are by
no means certain. Factors such as timing, the economic
importance of aid, the security of the incumbent regime
and the strength of the opposition all help to determine
the effectiveness of conditioned aid. The strength of
donor resolve and adherence to an agreed position will
depend on diplomatic, strategic and commercial
considerations, and play a role in influencing the
calculations of the recipient government. Relatively
strong and influential governments know that they can
play donors off against one another if there are
substantial interests at stake.
The implications for aid donors is that political
conditionality will only work under certain fairly
restricted conditions and should therefore be carefully
assessed on a case by case basis. It is likely that donor
actions will fall short of their rhetoric of using aid to
promote political reform and a retreat from negative
sanctions is to be expected. Of course there will be
situations where individual donors will want to
terminate or suspend aid to punish regimes which have
violated norms of human rights and political freedoms,
but there is no guarantee that these will bring about any
far-reaching improvements, and some would argue
that the situation could actually worsen as a result
(Tomasevski 1989).
For these reasons some commentators have argued that
a reorientation of an id programme towards sectors
which are less vulnerable to élite capture and of direct
benefit to the poor (primary education and healthcare
as opposed to large scale capital aid projects) can be
more effective than suspension or termination (Waller
1992). Others advocate channelling more funds
through NGOs and private associations, although
there may be practical and legal limitations on the
extent to which this is possible. Whatever mechanisms
are chosen, positive measures are more likely to be
favoured by donors to encourage reforms, but these are
far from straightforward; governments will resist a
diversion of aid away from infrastructure projects and
NGOs have a limited capacity to absorb large amounts
of external funding, in which case progress is likely to
be slow and the achievements in terms of promoting
good government, rather small.
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